This paper presents an approach for integrating formal methods tools. Given a speci c application, for each tool involved, a formal speci cation has to be developed. As di erent tools are used for di erent purposes, the various speci cations do not necessarily contain the same information. The proposed approach is based on dividing each speci cation in two parts, LOG and ENV . According to the purposes for which the tools will be used, the key idea is to rst identify the information that is likely to change. This information is then put in the LOG part (for logic), which is required to be as independent of the formalism/tool as possible. Ideally, it is equivalent in all speci cations such that the information in LOG can easily be modi ed in all system artifacts. It is demonstrated how this approach can be used to apply PVS and VDM on one aspect of a substantial example: the scenario of an access control. We de ne a scenario as all possible sequences of events. The paper contains a general presentation of the features of the access control. Parts of the VDM speci cation covering the entire functionality are shown. It is worth noticing that the proposed approach di ers from earlier work 1] in a sense that there exists a mapping only between the LOG parts of the speci cations rather than between the entire speci cations.
Introduction

An Access Control as a Case Study
The Roles of VDM and PVS
In 7] a taxonomy of applications is given. According to the item relative di culty of data, control, and algorithmic aspects of problem, SSD may essentially be classi ed as a mixed data-control problem. VDM-SL 17] is a speci cation language that is well-suited for modeling data. VDM-SL has been chosen as a speci cation language, even though it might not be the rst candidate for modeling event-based systems. For VDM-SL there is good tool support: the IFAD Toolbox for VDM-SL 11] supports analysis by animation and test and automatic code generation from speci cations.
Subsequently, a rigorous analysis has been carried out on part of the functionality by means of the theorem prover PVS 21] . The results of this analysis are reported in 10].
A Key Concept from the Access Control: Events and Scenarios
One of the key concepts of SSD is that of an event. As we shall see in Sect. 2, there are about 30 events, modeled in VDM by so-called interface functions. Essentially, an event is triggered when the guard or the operator interacts with the system.
In the analysis phase using PVS the concept of a scenario has been introduced. We de ne a scenario as the set of all valid sequences of events. It can be seen as a graph. By a valid sequence of events we mean those that are covered by the speci cation. The scenario of SSD will be used as an example throughout this paper.
Problem De nition
In the present case study, some of the challenges have been tackled using IFAD VDM and some using PVS. Based on the given application, this paper aims at answering the following two questions:
1. Why is it necessary to use two di erent tools, such as PVS and the IFAD Toolbox for VDM-SL ? 2. These tools serve di erent purposes. Thus, the developer has to to cope with the fact that their underlying formalisms are rather di erent. How has this transition from one formalism to the other been made ?
An Approach called LOG-ENV
In order to be able to exploit both the features of PVS and the ones of the IFAD toolbox, the two formalisms need to be linked. We have to deal with two system artifacts of SSD: a VDM-SL speci cation and a PVS speci cation. In this project, rst a VDM speci cation has been developed. Then, it turned out that part of SSD's functionality required to be investigated more closely. Thus, part of the requirements have been formalized in the speci cation language of PVS. One of the results of the analysis using PVS was that the requirements (and the VDM-SL speci cation !) were contradictory. Thus, changes had to made in both the requirements document and all speci cations involved (in VDM-SL and PVS). The motivation of our approach is to facilitate these changes. Of course, having at one's disposal an e ective means of going back and forth between the two formalisms is a key feature for the given development process. Our solution to this problem consists of dividing the speci cation into two parts, called LOG and ENV (for logic and environment). The key idea is that those parts of the speci cation which are likely to change are assigned to LOG. We will refer to this separation in the remainder of this paper as LOG-ENV.
The goal of LOG-ENV is to ease the transition between the VDM speci cation SPEC VDM and the PVS speci cation SPEC PVS . Both of these speci cations consist of a LOG and an ENV part. Altogether, there are four parts of speci cation, LOG VDM , ENV VDM and LOG PVS , ENV PVS , respectively. Thus, we may want to write SPEC VDM = LOG VDM + ENV VDM and SPEC PVS = LOG PVS + ENV PVS . We would like to point out that the transition between the two formalisms is not automatic. Rather, by making the two LOG parts as identical as possible, we aim at facilitating the transition from one tool to the other, once the environments ENV VDM and ENV PVS have been set up.
Overview of this Paper
A presentation of the access control will be given in Sect. 2. First, the basic concepts will be discussed. Parts of the VDM speci cation are shown for the interested reader. SSD essentially provides an interface between the operator, the system and the guards on duty. The role of the operator is discussed in Sect. 2.1.1 followed by the role of the guard in Sect. 2.1.2. After a brief overview of advanced features within SSD, the notions of events and scenarios are introduced in Sect. 2.2. Section 2 concludes with a discussion of system size. Section 3 discusses the integration of VDM and PVS. Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 aim at motivating why these tools are required for such a project. Section 3.4 gives a general presentation of the LOG-ENV principle, which is illustrated on an example in Sect. 3.5. The paper concludes with a discussion in Sect. 4.
An Access Control called SSD
This section begins with a general presentation of an access control called SSD. Also, parts of the VDM-SL speci cation will be given. It is assumed that the reader has a basic understanding of the VDM terminology 12]. Section 2.2 introduces events and scenarios in the context of SSD. Section 2 concludes with a brief discussion of the size of the application and the case study.
General Presentation
CSS is a comprehensive security system which has been developed by the Austrian Research Centre 30] . SSD is one module of CSS and essentially deals with access control issues. This module is being re-developed at the Technical University of Graz in order to investigate the bene ts of formal methods in software development.
SSD is an access control and essentially provides an interface to the guards on duty. The basic principle is as follows: there are a number of guards each of which follows a certain round, for example to supervise a factory by night. Each round consists of an (ordered) list of stations which are supposed to be visited (and \hit") one-by-one.
All information that is stored by SSD internally, is essentially a collection of rounds. In the terms of VDM, the global state of SSD is implemented as a mapping RDS of type RMap from the round's address of type R-Adr to elements of type R. R contains all relevant information for a round. A round can be in state selected or unselected. The interesting rounds are the ones that are selected. Only when the round has been selected, it may be supervised by a guard. Each selected round has its proper selection mode. Altogether, there are three selection modes. In a round, either there is one guard or a team of two guards. For each of these options, there is one selection mode. The (partial) speci cation that will be given later covers much of selection mode executing with one guard.
When the operator selects a round, one of the three selection modes has to be chosen. The selection modes aimed at supervision are called executing. Recording is a selection mode where the guard proceeds through the round in order to pre-set the mean times it takes him or her from one station to the next. We will now show the top-level de nition of type R, which is a type for holding all relevant information of a round 2 . A very limited discussion of each of these elds will be given below. R-Adr is the address of the round which is simply an identi er of the round. RoundState holds a list of stations followed by the SelectionMode given above. Then, there is information for the system to be able to keep track of which ones are the LastHitStation and the NextHitStation, respectively. Once the guard has hit the rst station of the round (\starting" it), the round is considered running. A round may only be selected for executing if it is both programmed and recorded meaning that a list of stations has been assigned to the round and that the mean time it may take a guard from one station to the next has been determined. Finally, there is a round-timer and a eld holding information if the round has been interrupted. This block is followed by a so-called invariant de nition constraining the datatype to those rounds that are considered well-formed. The invariant consists of a number of predicates which will not be explained any further.
The list of stations is stored using the following type:
RdStations = seq of RdStationData inv s==wf_any_but_first_S_time_dev(s) and wf_first_S_no_sectimetimedev(s) and 2 Compared to the original speci cation, the elds and invariants for a mechanism called switches are not shown. Now, it will be shown how a single station has been formalized: for each occurrence 3 of a station in a round, there is an address S-Adr of the station, which is used as an identi er, followed by a number of elds used for checking if the time it took the guard from the previous station to this one is among the permissible limits. Then, there is a ag iscodable which is set depending on whether the station will return the identity of the guard after a hit or not. 
Each occurrence of a station has its own state. Initially the station is in state normal. Usually, the station is put in state hit once that guard has hit the station. Alternatively, the station may be put in a speci c state indicating an error condition. If a station has been disabled it will be skipped and can not (does not have to) be visited by the guard.
The Role of the Operator
In SSD, there is a human operator who supervises the system. The operator may select, interrupt, and terminate rounds. He or she may also take stations out of order temporarily (disable them) or enable the guard to continue the round at some station if the round has been interrupted.
At this level of abstraction, the interface of SSD is modeled by a number of so-called interface functions. The rst example for such an interface operation is the one for the operator to select a round for executing with one guard. Again, we do not expect the reader to understand every detail. This is an example for an extended implicit operation, meaning that there are both implicit and explicit representations of the operation's functionality. OPselX1 takes a round r0 as its argument and returns the updated round new-r. It operates on the global state RDS as a side-e ect where the updated round is also written back to.
In the explicit part, rst two temporary local states are de ned. Then, the (new) round is put in selection mode executing with one guard and a ag is set, indicating that the round is waiting for the guard to hit the rst station. Finally, the new round is written back to the global state.
The explicit part is followed by the implicit part. It consists of a pre-and a post condition. Essentially, this operation may only be invoked, provided recording and programming have already taken place and that once the operation has been carried out. According to the post condition, after invocation, the round is selected for executing with one guard.
The Role of the Guard
The main task of the guard is to visit (and \hit") stations. In selection mode recording the guard is asked to walk through the round such that the mean time values to get from one station to the next can be determined.
Hitting a Station. Once the operator has selected a round, he or she has enabled the guard to start the round by hitting the rst station of that round 4 Essentially, after operation HX1 rst has been invoked, the round is no longer waiting to begin, the identity of a particular guard has been assigned to the round and a reference to the station last hit has been stored.
An intermediate station is any station but the rst and the last one. The following operation deals with the situation that the guard has hit such a station, which is the \normal" case: HX1norm (r0 : R, hr: S_hit_return, hit_s: SI) new_r: R == ( ... ) ext wr RDS pre R_Mode_ex1(r0) and R_running(r0) and (1 < hit_s) and (hit_s < max_S(r0)) and hit_s=next_hit_S(r0) and R_exists(r0,RDS) and ( S_returned_id(hr) => G_on_duty_in_R(r0,G_id(hr)) ) post S_last_hit(new_r)= hit_s and S_time_last_hit(new_r) = when_hit_S(hr) and R_exists(new_r,RDS) and same_R(new_r,r0);
A round is said to be terminated when the last station has been hit: 
Advanced Features
There are a number of advanced features of SSD including automatic round supervision, automatic switches, and stations can be disabled/enabled.
Automatic supervision by checking error conditions frees the operator from supervising every round all the time. Whenever a station has been hit, a number of checks are performed: Is the guard's identity ok ? Did the guard hit the expected station ? Is the time it took the guard from one station to the next su ciently close to the \mean" time ? In case one of these checks fails, the round is interrupted and the operator is asked to interact. Another interesting feature is the (automatic) treatment of switches. Switches make sure that devices like doors open or close automatically when a certain station of the round has been hit. Among the devices that may be controlled this way are intrusion circuits, doors and light switches. As it has already been pointed out, if a station has been disabled it will be skipped and can not be hit by the guard.
Events and Scenarios
One of the key concepts of SSD is that of an event. Essentially, one of about 30 SSD events is triggered when the guard or the operator interacts with the system. For one single round, Fig. 1 summarizes SSD's events and the set of possible transitions between events. The naming principle of events is as follows: basically there are three groups of events, designated by the rst letter/ rst two letters in the event name (\H", \OP" and \E", respectively).
The rst type of events may occur when a guard has visited (and \H"it) a station. For this group, there are separate events for each of the three selection-modes introduced in Sect. 2.1, executing with one guard (\X1"), executing with two guards (\X2") and recording (\RE"). Apart from a \normal" hit (an intermediate station, that is), there are events for the \ rst" and the \last" station, as well as events for hits which \continue" the round after it has been interrupted. In selection mode executing with two guards the rst guard (\G1") and the second one (\G2") are distinguished. If, at any time, the guard is threatened by an intruder, a mechanism called silent alarm may be activated. The corresponding event is called Halarm.
The second type of event corresponds to operator commands (\OP"). The operator may select (\sel") a round for any of the selection-modes, interrupt a round (\int"), enable the guard to continue after the round has been interrupted (\cont") or terminate the round (\term"). A pending alarm needs to be cleared (\clralarm") before the guard may be enabled to continue. Finally, there is a mechanism of taking single stations temporarily out of order: the operator may disable (\dis") and enable (\en") stations, provided the round is unselected.
The third type of event deals with error handling features (\E"). Again, most of the events are separated by selection-mode. The basic three types of error are wrong sequence of stations followed (\seq"), time limits exceeded (\time") and identi cation error (\id"). Fig. 1 presents the set of events and possible sequences of events. To be of practical use, all that remains to be de ned is the set of potential rst events, FirstEvents = fOPenS ; OPdisS; OPselRE; OPselX 1; OPselX 2g. In other words, it is the operator who always causes the initial event of a round. He or she may either disable/enable one of its stations or select the round.
System Size
Both the original implementation of SSD, and the one under development using formal methods, are based on a list of 60 requirements given on 10 A4 pages, expressed in English language. The program developed using \traditional" methods, which of course, has not been made available, consists of about 12.000 lines of PASCAL code.
In the rst phase of this case study, about 35 A4 pages of VDM speci cation have been developed. This has taken 6 months. The entire documentation including the formal speci cation, informal text and some diagrams, consists of 70 A4 pages.
Subsequently, PVS has been used to perform a rigorous analysis of a critical part of SSD's functionality 10]. This speci cation consists of about a thousand lines. 3 Events, Scenarios in VDM and in PVS As pointed out previously, this paper aims at answering the following two questions: rst, why is it necessary to use two di erent tools ? This will be subject of sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Second, how has the transition been made, from one formalism to the other ? This will be discussed in the remainder of Sect. 3. Our approach consists of dividing the speci cation into two parts, which will be given in Sect. 3.4. In Fig. 1 , one aspect of SSD's behavior has been given: its scenario. In the present section, it will serve as an example for linking the tools PVS and VDM. It will be shown how to create a two-part speci cation for both formalisms. The section concludes with the VDM and PVS speci cations for scenarios, constructed following the two-part approach.
Why VDM ?
At the beginning of the present case-study, a tool has been selected to support the development. The scope of this project is characterized by the fact that a large part of the development life cycle has to be covered: the development is based on a document containing a set of informal requirements. Ultimately, the module has to be implemented in a programming language like C++ such that the formally developed version can be compared to the one developed using \traditional" methods.
In formal methods there is a variety of environments (and tools) including a wide range of features such as theorem proving, interpretation and automatic code generation from speci cations 20, 18] .
VDM-SL is a speci cation language of a development method called VDM. It has been stan- 
Why PVS ?
When working on the VDM speci cation, it has turned out that part of the requirements focused on a low operational level (or \how"-statements) rather than pointing out \what" properties the system should have. Hence, a high amount of details made the description di cult to understand. Most worrying, a simple example has been identi ed for which the functionality proposed by the requirements obviously fails.
There are several approaches to formal speci cation based analysis 6] including testing, theorem proving and model checking. The IFAD Toolbox supports analysis of speci cations by animation and testing. However, it was felt that these features would not be su cient. Model checkers essentially perform an explicit enumeration of all possible states 29]. This principle has been extended 5, 13].
Theorem provers 20] are based on entirely di erent principles. They allow to formally prove general properties to be satis ed by a speci cation. There is a great number of theorem provers 23] including HOL, COQ, Isabelle and PVS. We have chosen to use a theorem prover called the Prototype Veri cation System (PVS) 21, 26, 27] . It has been applied successfully to many substantial examples 24]. Also, information of who to \map" a VDM speci cation into a PVS speci cation is available 1]. The results of our work using PVS are reported in 10]. Figure 2 : THE LOG-ENV principle: use of a two-part speci cation instead of having a monolithic speci cation. The LOG part (for logic) contains the part of the speci cation that it likely to change. The rest of the speci cation is assigned to ENV .
Why VDM and PVS ?
In formal methods there is a variety of features 20] and tools 18] . From what has been said above, it should have become clear, that it is unreasonable to expect one single tool to be used for the whole of a formal development project. We believe that ideally, a tool should only be used for those tasks for which it is best suited. The question that arises is, whether two or more tools may be integrated to form a new tool and how to do that e ciently.
Transition Principle LOG-ENV
As it has been said before, some challenges of the case study have been tackled using IFAD VDM and some using PVS. In order to exploit the features of PVS and those of the IFAD toolbox, their formalisms need to be linked. In other words, we have to deal with two system artifacts: a VDM-SL speci cation and a PVS speci cation. Our approach for this problem consists of dividing the speci cation into two parts, one called LOG (for logic) and another one called (ENV for environment). This principle is illustrated in Fig. 2 . For brevity, we call it LOG-ENV.
How should the speci cation be divided ? The key idea here is to put the part of the speci cation that it likely to change into LOG.
The goal of LOG-ENV is to ease the transition between the VDM speci cation and the PVS speci cation, each of which consists of a LOG and an ENV part. Thus we have two speci cations SPEC VDM and SPEC PVS . In each of these speci cation, there are two parts, LOG VDM , ENV VDM and LOG PVS , ENV PVS , respectively. Thus, we may want to write SPEC VDM = LOG VDM + ENV VDM and SPEC PVS = LOG PVS + ENV PVS .
Another question that arises is whether the assumption LOG VDM u LOG PVS is reasonable, for example because of di erences in the speci cation languages. However, in the Sect. 3.5 a pattern will be presented for which the assumption is considered valid.
Even though the transition between the two formalisms is not meant to be totally automatic, by making the two LOG parts as identical as possible, we aim at facilitating the transition. By writing LOG VDM u LOG PVS we mean that the di erences between LOG VDM and LOG PVS are \minor" (in the examples given below, the only di erences between LOG VDM and LOG PVS are due to the di erences of the speci cation languages). In Fig. 3 the LOG-ENV principle is applied to integrating PVS and VDM: the LOG part can be exchanged easily, because LOG PVS;VDM is part of both the VDM and the PVS speci cation. Figure 3 : LOG-ENV applied to PVS and VDM: the LOG part can be exchanged easily, because LOG PVS;VDM is part of both the VDM and the PVS speci cations. LOG-ENV di ers from earlier work 1] in a sense that there exists a mapping only between the LOG parts of the speci cations rather than between the entire speci cations.
Example
In the following, LOG-ENV will be applied to the scenario example. We will begin by identifying adequate representations in PVS and VDM, based on the task to be performed by PVS on the example.
Dividing the example speci cation. The process of drawing a line between LOG and ENV can be guided by the following questions: Given the scenario example... What is the objective of PVS in this example ? The set of possible sequences of events given in Fig. 1 (the scenario) has been de ned based on the insights gained in the analysis of the speci cation rather than directly on the requirements. However, the following rule is part of the requirements:
Rule: In selection mode executing, it shall be possible to interrupt a round at any time.
The question is whether the given scenario satis es this rule. PVS can be used for the proof of such a property. The result of such a proof attempt is either a change request for the scenario, or an approval. In consequence, it is the scenario itself that will be subject to change. It is assigned to LOG PVS (and LOG VDM ). The LOG PVS part of the speci cation is given in Fig. 4 5 . This is the rst half of a le called scenario.pvs. It de nes a function next_event which returns the boolean value true for all valid sequences of events. The function takes a tuple of two events as arguments, where f follows e in time 6 .
ENV PVS for the Scenario Example
The second part of the le scenario.pvs, corresponding to ENV PVS in shown in Fig. 5 . Datatype event de nes all possible events, followed by a number of predicates each of which divide the predicates into two groups. These predicates will be needed by the theorem called interrupt_always_possible, shown at the end of the le: is_error_event holds for all events signaling that an error has occurred. This information is relevant because in the case of error the round will be interrupted automatically, and can thus not be interrupted once more. is_recording_event denotes all the events of selection-mode recording, where interruption is not possible. is_opinterrupt_event holds for the operator command of round interruption. Clearly, the operator may not interrupt the same round twice in a row. event_leads_to_active_round holds only for those events, which do not \un-select" the round.
LOG VDM for the Scenario
In the case study as well as in the present example, the VDM speci cation covers the entire functionality of SSD. This speci cation is structured as follows: there are a state, a number of interface operations, datatype de nitions, and auxiliary functions. Parts of the VDM speci cation have been shown in Sect. 2. There is a strong link between interface functions and the events given in Fig. 1 , simply because for each of the given events, there is one interface function. As it can be seen in Sect. 2, they even share the same names.
What is the objective of VDM in the given example ? It is important for the VDM speci cation to have at its disposal a means for determining whether a sequence of events that has occurred in reality is in fact covered by the system. In consequence, the system may be guaranteed never Among other things, interface functions are part of ENV VDM whereas the scenario is again the only thing that is part of LOG VDM , shown in Fig. 6 .
Please note that there are some syntactic di erences between LOG PVS and LOG VDM . This is why we write LOG VDM u LOG PVS instead of LOG VDM = LOG PVS .
ENV VDM for the Scenario Example
Major parts of the VDM speci cation have been shown in Sect. 2. According to this example, these pieces of speci cation are all part of ENV VDM . The only de nition that has to be added is the datatype event. ENV VDM is shown in Fig. 7 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach for integrating two tools: PVS and the IFAD Toolbox. Based on an example, it has been shown why it is necessary to use two di erent tools, and how the transition from one formalism to the other has been made. What we call the LOG-ENV principle encourages to divide a speci cation into two parts. In an example, it has been demonstrated how the part of the speci cation that is likely to change, can be ... Compensate for Di erences in the Environments. LOG-ENV provides a means for compensating for di erences between the features among two environments. In the example given above, the PVS proof required a number of of auxiliary predicates. On the other hand, the VDM speci cation contains \implementations" of events by means of interface functions. Either of these constructs are irrelevant in the opposite formalism.
-----------------------ENV VDM part -----------------------------------
A Means for Abstraction. Given two speci cations SPEC VDM and SPEC PVS , we assumed that each of them consists of two parts LOG VDM , ENV VDM and LOG PVS , ENV PVS , respectively. In order to gain an understanding of the high-level concepts of the system, the ENV parts of the speci cation are of secondary interest. We would like to attract the attention of the reader to the fact, that LOG-ENV represents a means for abstraction without restricting the features that may be performed by the two tools.
Future Work
The selection of the boundary between LOG and ENV very much depends on the concrete task. So far, in 10] and the present paper, two applications have been presented. The next step of the ongoing case study will be to set up and apply a systematic testing process covering the whole of SSD's functionality. There, the proposed principle is going to be applied on an aspect of the testing process.
Related Work
Interest in merging formal methods tools is growing 16, 22, 19, 8, 4] . Concerning the tools used in the present case study, the IFAD Toolbox is begin extended with facilities for theorem proving 1, 3, 2]. Recently, PVS has been complemented with features for model checking 25, 28] . In previous work reported in 10], another part of SSD's functionality has been investigated using PVS. There, the transition is based on the same principle as in this paper. This is where the idea for building the LOG and ENV parts has emerged. Facilitating the transition of core concepts from one speci cation language to another is an extension of previous work describing the mapping from one speci cation language to another 1, 15].
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